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Abstract
A state which does not desire an arms race may nevertheless acquire new
weapons if it believes another state will acquire them. If each state assigns some
arbitrarily small probability to the event that the other state has a dominant
strategy to acquire more weapons, then a multiplier eﬀect appears, and the
unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium involves an arms race with probability one.
However, if the prior probability that a player is a dominant strategy type is
suﬃciently small, then there is an equilibrium of the cheap-talk extension of
t h ea r m sr a c eg a m ew h e r et h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fa na r m sr a c ei sc l o s et oz e r o .
∗We thank Daniel Diermeier, Tim Feddersen, Eric Maskin, Ariel Rubinstein and participants in
the IAS Economics workshop for useful comments. Any errors are our responsibility.
1￿Pakistan does not intend to aggress...[W]e are the victim of (Indian) aggressions.￿
Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan as reported by the Pakistan News Service, June
1999.
￿In India, one often hears that ￿Pakistan understands￿ that India has no hostile
designs on it..In Pakistan, however, there is strong sense that the nation￿s survival is
potentially at risk in the event of a major Indian attack. Without a clearer under-
standing of India￿s defence doctrine, this could generate a catastrophic miscalculation,￿
CSIS South Asia Monitor, February 1, 1999
￿Whatever happens in India, they blame Pakistan. Whatever happens in Pakistan,
we blame India...[N]either Pakistan nor India has gained anything from the con￿icts
and tensions of the past 25 years.￿ Nawaz Sharif, then Prime Minister of Pakistan,
Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1999.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Two states have to decide whether or not to invest in a new weapons system. Each
state thinks the best possible outcome is for neither side to invest in new weapons, but
the worst possible situation is to be unarmed when the other state is armed. So no
state desires an arms race, but each state will acquire new weapons if it believes the
other state will acquire them. If these preferences are common knowledge, then two
pure strategy Nash equilibria exist: an ￿arms race equilibrium￿ in which both states
acquire new weapons, and a ￿detente equilibrium￿ in which neither state acquires
new weapons. Rational players should be able to coordinate on the Pareto dominant
detente equilibrium, perhaps using communication (O￿Neill [12]). However, suppose
each state assigns some very small probability to the event that the opponent is a
truly aggressive type for whom acquiring arms is a dominant strategy. For example,
the fact that India actually has no desire to attack Pakistan may not be known for
certain in Pakistan. This gives Pakistan a reason to arm in self-defense. But it is
usually hard to distinguish between oﬀensive and defensive weapons (Schelling [17],
Jervis [7]), so the suspicion that Pakistan may arm, for whatever purpose, makes
India more likely to arm. Anticipating this, Pakistan has an even stronger reason to
arm, and so on. So as Schelling [17] pointed out, a multiplier eﬀect appears, creating
an escalating cycle of pessimistic expectations toward mutual armaments.
We formalize the situation as follows. Each state has a type which parameterizes
the propensity to arm. The state￿s true type is its private information, and types are
independently drawn from a continuous distribution. For all types, the worst possible
outcome is to be unarmed while the opponent arms. However, the type determines
whether or not the state prefers to arm when it is unsure about the actions of the
opponent. At one end of the distribution are the aggressive ￿dominant strategy￿
types: they prefer to arm regardless of the opponent￿s actions. At the other end of
the distribution are the peaceful types who prefer to arm only if they are virtually
sure that the opponent will arm. Let the fraction of dominant strategy types be some
2small ε > 0. These types will certainly arm, but this triggers a multiplier eﬀect. Some
fraction δ > 0 of all types are not dominant strategy types but prefer to arm when the
opponent arms with at least probability ε. These ￿almost dominant strategy types￿
must arm in equilibrium. But then, all types that prefer to arm when the opponent
arms with at least probability ε+δ must arm, etc. The spiral of ever more pessimistic
expectations causes more and more types to arm. Even though each state thinks it
is extremely unlikely that the opponent is the dominant strategy type, the unique
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium may involve an arms race with probability one.
What can be done to escape this logic ? World leaders, aware that escalating fear
may cause arms races and con￿ict, seem to believe in the importance of communica-
tion. Ronald Reagan reported in his diary the message he wanted to communicate
to Soviet foreign minister Gromyko: ￿I have a feeling we￿ll get nowhere with arms
reductions while they are as suspicious of our motives as we are of theirs. I believe we
need a meeting to see if we can￿t make them understand we have no designs on them
but think they have designs on us￿ (Reagan [15]). Arms control talks eventually did
lead to a 50% reduction in strategic forces and the elimination of intermediate and
medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe. However, in the beginning of his adminis-
tration Reagan had used aggressive rhetoric, declaring the Soviet Union to be an ￿evil
empire￿ prepared ￿to commit any crime, to lie, to steal￿ to achieve its goals (Reagan
[14]). The precise role of communication in signalling a ￿type￿ may be subtle. This
motivates our study.
We consider a cheap-talk extension of the arms race game. Before making the
decision to arm, each state sends a hawkish (aggressive) or a dovish (conciliatory)
message to the opponent. The messages are pure cheap-talk: a state is free to arm
itself regardless of what messages were sent. Since all types are better oﬀ if the
opponent does not arm (whatever they themselves decide to do) one might suspect
that all types would send whatever message is most likely to persuade the opponent
not to arm. If this were the case, then cheap talk would be uninformative, and
we would be back in the original arms race spiral. However, cheap talk can be
informative. The reason is that for most types it is not only the probability that the
opponent arms that matters - it is also important to be able to coordinate with the
opponent. The main result of this paper is that if the dominant strategy types are
suﬃciently rare, then there exists an equilibrium of the cheap-talk extension where
the probability of an arms race is close to zero. Thus, communication can expand the
set of equilibria. Indeed, it can have the dramatic eﬀect of reducing the probability
of an arms race from one to almost zero!1
The equilibrium works as follows. Most types send the dovish message. The
exception is a small number of fairly tough types who have a high propensity to arm,
but not so high as to be dominant strategy types. These fairly tough types send
1In any cheap talk game, there are ￿babbling￿ equilibria where the parties simply disregard
the messages. However, throughout the paper we assume that if there are multiple Pareto ranked
equilibria, the players manage to coordinate on an eﬃcient one.
3the hawkish message. If the two states sent diﬀerent messages, the result is an arms
race: both states acquire new weapons. If both states sent hawkish messages then
neither state acquires any weapons. (The hawkish messages reveal that both states
are fairly tough, but not tough enough to be dominant strategy types). Finally, if
both states sent dovish messages, then the very tough types that have the highest
propensity to arm (including the dominant strategy types) acquire new weapons,
while the remaining types (who may be called normal)d on o t . I ft h en u m b e ro f
dominant strategy types is very small, then the number of normal types is close to
one, so the probability is close to one that both states are dovish and refrain from
acquiring weapons.
With a very small probability, a normal type will face a very tough type who
appears dovish at ￿rst but then arms unilaterally (￿a wolf in sheep￿s clothing￿). In
that case, the normal type￿s realized payoﬀ will be the lowest possible. Still, ex ante
the normal types are better oﬀ trusting an opponent who appears dovish, as long
as the probability that the opponent is very tough is suﬃciently low. The fairly
tough types, however, are not willing to take this gamble. Their propensity to arm
is high enough that they prefer to appear hawkish. Of course, since messages are
non-binding, the fairly tough types could send a dovish message and then go ahead
and arm anyway. However, with such a strategy they would always e n du pa r m i n g .
This would be worse for them than what they get in equilibrium, since in equilibrium
they avoid the arms race whenever they meet another fairly tough type. Being able
to coordinate in this way is valuable to the fairly tough types (recall that they are
not dominant strategy types). This separation of very tough types (who send the
dovish message) from fairly tough types (who send the hawkish message) prevents the
multiplier eﬀect. Notice that the very tough types prefer to appear dovish because
they are not interested in coordinating with the opponent. They know that they
themselves will surely arm, all they want to do is to encourage the opponent not to
arm, and this is done most eﬃciently by appearing dovish. Indeed, any cheap-talk
equilibrium which does not involve an arms race with probability one must have the
property that dominant strategy types sometimes arm unilaterally against peaceful
opponents. For the only way to prevent such unilateral arms build-up would be to
get the dominant strategy type to reveal his true nature, alerting the opponent that
he should arm too. But this would not be incentive compatible since the dominant
strategy type does not want his opponent to arm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model without
communication. A multiplier condition on the distribution of types is shown to be
necessary and suﬃcient for an arms race to occur with probability one even if the
dominant strategy types are very rare. Section 3 shows how cheap talk reduces the
probability of an arms race to almost zero when the dominant strategy types are
very rare. Section 4 discusses related literature and Section 5 concludes. Technical
calculations are contained in the appendix.
42 The Arms Race Game
Two players must simultaneously and independently decide whether or not to invest
in a new weapons program. The possible choices are Build new weapons (B) or No
new weapons (N). We normalize the payoﬀ to be zero for each player if both choose
N. A player who chooses N while the other player chooses B suﬀers a loss of d>0
units of utility. This loss represents the insecurity that a player suﬀers when the other
player has a more advanced weapons system than he has. (Psychological factors such
as ￿loss of prestige￿ could in￿uence d). A player who builds the new weapons system
does not have to suﬀer this insecurity, as he will always be at least as strong as his
opponent. On the other hand, he has to pay the cost of the new weapons. Let
player i￿s cost of acquiring new weapons be denoted ci ≥ 0. A player who builds the
new weapons system while his opponent does not obtains a gain of ￿>0 units of
utility. (Perhaps he can extract some resources from his weaker opponent, or gains
￿prestige￿ etc.). We shall be mainly interested in the case where ￿ is small, so that the
temptation to build new weapons is not too big. Player i￿s payoﬀs can be represented
in a payoﬀ matrix as follows (player i chooses a row, player j a column):
BN
B −ci ￿ − ci
N −d 0
(1)
If d>c i >￿for each i ∈ {1,2}, and if all payoﬀs are common knowledge, then there
are two pure strategy Nash equilibria: (B,B) and (N,N). In this case, rational players
should be able to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium (N,N). However, we
will assume ci is player i￿s private information.2 We refer to ci as player i￿s type.E a c h
player i knows his own type ci, but not the other player￿s type cj. Everything except
the true c1 and c2 is common knowledge. Each ci is independently drawn from the
same distribution, with cumulative distribution function denoted F. F has support
[0,ﬂ c]w i t hF(0) = 0,F 0(c) > 0w h e n e v e r0<c<ﬂ c, and F(ﬂ c)=1 . Assume ﬂ c<d .W e
will make the mild regularity assumption that F h a sap o w e rs e r i e sr e p r e s e n t a t i o n .






2The crucial point is that some privately observed parameter in￿uences a player￿s propensity to
arm. For convenience we consider the cost of acquiring new weapons. But the private information
could equally well relate to, for example, the bene￿t from being armed when the opponent is unarmed.
Nevertheless, in many real world cases incomplete information about cost may be paramount. For
example, a non-nuclear state which has access to ￿ssile material (plutonium and enriched uranium)
and technical expertise from the former Soviet Union may ￿nd it relatively cheap to develop nuclear
weapons - it would be very expensive otherwise. Whether or not a state has access to such material
and expertise may be hard to verify for an opponent.
5where the series converges uniformly on [0,ﬂ c].
Since −ci ≥− ﬂ c>−d, B is always a (strict) best response against B. Therefore
there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where all types choose B with probability one. Is
there any other Bayesian Nash equilibrium? Notice that N is a best response against
Nf o rp l a y e ri if and only if ci ≥ ￿. If ci <￿then player i is a dominant strategy type:
B is a strictly dominant strategy for him. The probability that player i is a dominant
strategy type is F(￿), which is close to zero if ￿ is small. The existence of dominant
strategy types may have a large eﬀect on the set of equilibria even as ￿ → 0. Indeed,
if the following condition is satis￿ed then even for arbitrarily small ￿>0 the unique
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is for all types to play B.
Deﬁnition 1 The distribution satis￿es the multiplier condition if F(c)d ≥ c for all
c ∈ [0,ﬂ c].
For example, the uniform distribution F(c)=c/ﬂ c satis￿es the multiplier condition
because d>ﬂ c implies cd/ﬂ c ≥ c for all c ≥ 0.3 More generally, the multiplier condition
is satis￿ed if F is concave (because F(c) ≥ c/ﬂ c ≥ c/d for all c ≥ 0w h e nF is
concave).4
Any equilibrium will have a cut-oﬀ property: if type ci builds new weapons, then
any type c0
i <c i will also build. Knowing that the dominant strategy types will
play B, a type which is ￿almost￿ a dominant strategy type (￿ − ci negative but
close to zero) will also play B. This ￿infects￿ other types with slightly higher ci, who
also decide to play B, and so on. If this contagion stops before all types have been
infected, then there must be some ￿cut-oﬀ type￿ c∗
i > 0 such that all types with a
lower cost than him play B and all types with a higher cost play N. Type c∗
i himself
must be indiﬀerent. Suppose for the moment that the equilibrium is symmetric, so
c∗
1 = c∗
2 = c∗. The condition that player i￿s type c∗ is indiﬀerent between B and N
when player j is expected to choose B with probability F(c∗)i sS(c∗)=0 , where
S(c) ≡ F(c)(d − c)+( 1− F(c))(￿ − c)( 2 )
However, if the multiplier condition is satis￿ed then S(c) > 0 for any ￿>0a n da n y
c ≥ 0, so there can be no symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium where N is chosen
with positive probability. The proof of Theorem 1 shows that there are no asymmetric
equilibria where N is chosen with positive probability either. Thus, if the multiplier
condition holds, then the fact that the dominant strategy types will de￿nitely choose
B triggers an arms race with probability one. Conversely, if the multiplier condition
is violated then for suﬃciently small ￿ there exists c∗ < ﬂ c such that S(c∗)=0 . That
3For any F,ﬂ c/F(ﬂ c)=ﬂ c<d ,s oasuﬃcient condition for the multiplier condition to hold is for
c/F(c) to be an increasing function. This is true in the uniform case.
4If F is suﬃciently convex then the multiplier condition will be violated. In this case, low cost
types are relatively rare compared to high cost types, and the contagion to play B will not necessarily
infect the whole population.
6means type c∗ is just indiﬀerent between building and not building if he thinks his
opponent plays B with probability F(c∗). Therefore, there exists a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium where N is chosen with positive probability.
Theorem 1 (i) If the multiplier condition is satis￿ed, then for any ￿>0 there is a
unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium all players choose B, regardless
of type. (ii) If the multiplier condition is violated, then for suﬃciently small ￿>0
there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where N is chosen with strictly positive
probability.
Proof. If ￿ ≥ d then B is a dominant strategy for all types, so the analysis is
trivial. Suppose instead that 0 <￿<d .First, we establish the cut-oﬀ property: if
B is a weak best response for type ci then it is a strict best response for type c0
i <c i.
Indeed, if player i thinks player j will choose B with probability pj, the payoﬀ to
player i from B is
pj(−ci)+( 1− pj)(￿ − ci)=( 1− pj)￿ − ci
while the payoﬀ from N is pj (−d)+(1−pj)￿0. Type ci weakly prefers B if and only
if
ci ≤ (1 − pj)￿ + pjd (3)
Notice that all of player i￿s types have the same beliefs about player j,s i n c et y p e s
are assumed to be uncorrelated. If type ci weakly prefers B, then inequality (3) is
strict for type c0
i <c i so type c0
i strictly prefers B. Now we can prove the two parts of
the theorem.
(i) If player j chooses B with probability one, then all of player i￿s types will
choose B since ﬂ c<d .Therefore, there is always an equilibrium where all players
choose B, regardless of type. Suppose in addition there is an equilibrium where N is
played with positive probability. We claim the multiplier condition is violated. If a
player chooses N then he must expect the opponent to choose N with strictly positive
probability, hence if N is chosen with positive probability by one player then both
players must choose N with positive probability. For i ∈ {1,2} let c∗
i be such that B
is a weak best response for player i at the equilibrium if and only if his type satis￿es
ci ≤ c∗
i. By hypothesis, c∗
i < ﬂ c, for otherwise player i chooses N with probability zero.
The probability that player i ∈ {1,2} chooses B is pi = F(c∗
i). Since type c∗
i must be
indiﬀerent between B and N,
c
∗





















since 0 <￿<dand F(c∗
1) ≤ F(c∗
2) < 1. Thus, the multiplier condition is violated.
7(ii) Suppose the multiplier condition is violated. Then, there exists c0 such that
c0 >d F(c0). For suﬃciently small ￿>0, we have S(c0) ≤ 0w h e r eS is de￿ned by (2).
Also, S(ﬂ c)=d − ﬂ c>0. By continuity, there is c∗ < ﬂ c such that S(c∗)=0 . Let each
player i choose B if and only if ci ≤ c∗.S i n c e S(c∗)=0 , by the construction of S
it follows that type c∗ is indiﬀerent between B and N. Type ci <c ∗ strictly prefers
Ba n dt y p eci >c ∗
i strictly prefers N. Thus, these strategies form a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Remark 1. The proof of Theorem 1 shows that when the multiplier condition
holds, the game is interim dominance solvable. After iterated elimination of strongly
(interim) dominated strategies only the ￿arms race￿ outcome remains.
Remark 2. The arm race outcome is ineﬃcient because all types prefer NN to
BB.
Remark 3. The arms race is caused by mutual distrust. Suppose, contrary to
our assumptions, that c2 (but not c1) becomes common knowledge as soon as the
types are determined by nature. Then there would exist a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
where player 2 as well as all the non-dominant strategy types of player 1 choose
N whenever c2 ≥ (1 − F(￿))￿ + F(￿)d, which happens with probability close to 1
for ￿ small enough. If both c1 and c2 become common knowledge as soon as they
are determined by nature, then there is an equilibrium where both players choose N
whenever c1 ≥ ￿ and c2 ≥ ￿, which again happens with probability close to 1 for ￿
small enough.
3C h e a p T a l k
In this section we will assume the multiplier condition holds. Without cheap talk,
there is a discontinuity in the equilibrium correspondence: if ￿ were zero then there
would be an equilibrium where all types choose N, but for any ￿>0, a￿ c o n t a g i o n ￿
is started by the fraction F(￿) > 0 of dominant strategy types. The multiplier
condition guarantees that each player who is not a dominant strategy type will choose
B whenever he thinks all types that have lower cost than him will choose B. Thus,
the game unravels and everybody plays B, as shown in Theorem 1. We now show
that adding cheap talk restores continuity in the sense that for small enough ￿>0
there exists an equilibrium where almost all types choose N.
Since we are assuming ￿>0a n dd>0, no matter what player i plans to do
he always strictly prefers player j to choose N. This makes credible communication
diﬃcult but not impossible to achieve. We will divide the types into three groups:
￿very tough￿, ￿fairly tough￿, and ￿normal.￿ The very tough types have the lowest
cost and will always play B. The fairly tough types have a slightly higher cost, and
are willing to play N as long as they are assured that they are not facing a very tough
type (who would play B against them). Thus, very tough types and fairly tough types
must send diﬀerent messages, making it possible for fairly tough types to coordinate
on N with other fairly tough types while playing B against very tough types. This
8is the way we break the contagion. Of course, the very tough types must be given
some incentive to separate themselves from the fairly tough types in this way. This
is done by letting them pool with the normal types, allowing the very tough types
to arm unilaterally against the normal types. The normal type is willing to be taken
advantage of in this way as long as it happens suﬃciently infrequently. Most of the
time, normal types will meet other normal types and coexist peacefully. We now
formalize these arguments.
In the cheap talk extension of the arms race game there are three stages. In stage
zero, nature determines c1 and c2,a n dci becomes player i￿s private information. In
stage one, messages are announced simultaneously and publicly. The two messages
that will be sent in equilibrium will be labelled Dove and Hawk. ￿Dove￿ is interpreted
as a conciliatory message and ￿Hawk￿ is interpreted as an aggressive message. (Other
messages can be allowed, but will not be sent in equilibrium.) In stage two, the players
simultaneously choose either B or N, and player i￿s payoﬀ is determined by his payoﬀ
matrix (1). The messages sent in stage one do not in￿uence the payoﬀs directly, but
they may convey information about what the players plan to do in the future. Our
main theorem states that arms races can be avoided almost surely if the fraction of
dominant strategy types F(￿)i ss u ﬃciently small, that is, if ￿>0i ss u ﬃciently
small.
Theorem 2 Suppose the multiplier condition is satis￿ed. For any δ > 0 there is
ﬂ ￿>0 such that if 0 <￿<ﬂ ￿ then there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
cheap-talk extension of the arms race game where N is played with at least probability
1 − δ.
The remainder of this section consists of the proof of this theorem. We need the
following lemma, which is proved in the Appendix.







































If ￿ → 0 then cH → 0.
Now let (cL,c ∗,c H)b ea sd e ￿ned by Lemma 1 and consider the following strategies
in the cheap talk extension of the arms race game. Player i is normal if ci >c H,
fairly tough if cL ≤ ci ≤ cH, and very tough if ci <c L. In stage 1, the cheap-talk
stage, player i says Hawk if he is fairly tough. Otherwise, he says Dove. In stage
2, the arms race stage, player i behaves as follows. If ci ≤ ￿ then he chooses B no
9matter what announcements were made in stage one. If ci >￿then player i plays
as follows: (i) if both players said Hawk then player i chooses N; (ii) if one player
s a i dD o v ea n dt h eo t h e rs a i dH a w kt h e np l a y e ri chooses B; (iii) if both players said
Dove then player i chooses N if and only if ci ≥ c∗; (iv) If any message except Dove
or Hawk was sent by any player then player i chooses B.
We describe the equilibrium announcements made in stage 1, and the actions
played on the equilibrium path in stage 2, in the table below. For example, if player
1 is very tough (c1 <c L) and player 2 is fairly tough (cL ≤ c2 ≤ cH), then player 1

















We claim that for small enough ￿>0, these strategies form a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium5 of the cheap talk extension of the arms race game. Notice for future
reference that (5) and the fact that ￿<c L implies that there are more normal types





In fact the right hand side of (8) will be close to zero and the left hand side close to
one for ￿ small (for then both cL and cH will be close to zero).
Lemma 2 The strategies speci￿ed above are sequentially rational in the action stage
for all types, following all messages.
Proof. If ci ≤ ￿, then it is clearly in player i￿s interest to choose B no matter
what happened in stage 1. Suppose ci >￿ .If both players announced Hawk in stage
1, then the opponent is expected to choose N in stage 2, and N is a best response
against N. If one player said Dove and the other Hawk, or someone said something
else than ￿Hawk￿ or ￿Dove￿, then the opponent is expected to choose B in stage 2,
and B is a best response against B. Finally, suppose both players said Dove in stage
5See Fudenberg and Tirole [6] for a formal de￿nition.
101. In this case, player i thinks his opponent is either a normal type who will choose
N, or a very tough type who will choose B (recall that fairly tough types are the only
ones who say Hawk in equilibrium). Now there are 1−F(cH) normal types and F(cL)
very tough types. Then (7) implies that player i is indiﬀerent between B and N if he
is of type ci = c∗. Clearly it is a best response for player i to choose B if ci <c ∗ and
Ni fci ≥ c∗.
We now turn to the cheap talk stage. Notice that for any type the expected utility
from following the strategies speci￿ed above is greater than what he gets from playing
BB for sure. Hence, no type has an incentive to send any message other than Hawk
or Dove.
Lemma 3 Player i prefers to say Dove if ci ≤ ￿.
Proof. The dominant strategy type will go on to choose B for sure, so his objective
is simply to maximize the probability of his opponent choosing N. If player i says
Hawk, his opponent will choose N if and only if the opponent is a fairly tough type
(who says Hawk according to his equilibrium strategy), an event which occurs with
probability F(cH) − F(cL). If player i says Dove, his opponent will choose N if and
only if the opponent is a normal type (who says Dove according to his equilibrium
strategy), an event which occurs with probability 1 − F(cH). By (8), the dominant
strategy type prefers to say Dove.
Lemma 4 Player i prefers to say Dove if ￿<c i <c L and Hawk if cL ≤ ci <c ∗.
Proof. Suppose ￿<c i <c ∗. First, suppose player i says Hawk. Then if the
other player also says Hawk both will choose N. This event occurs with probability







Suppose instead player i says Dove. Since ci <c ∗ player i will then choose B at the
action stage whatever his opponent (player j) has said. Player j will choose N if and
only if he is a normal type (who says Dove according to his equilibrium strategy), an
event which occurs with probability 1 − F(cH). Therefore, player i￿s expected payoﬀ





H)(−ci)( 1 0 )
But, equation (5) implies that (9) equals (10) if ci = cL so player i of type cL is
indiﬀerent between Dove and Hawk. If ci >c L, (10) is smaller than (9) so player i
prefers to say Hawk. If ￿<c i <c L, (10) is bigger than (9) so player i prefers to say
Dove in this case.
Lemma 5 Player i prefers to say Hawk if c∗ ≤ ci ≤ cH and Dove if ci >c H.
11Proof. Suppose ci ≥ c∗. First, suppose player i says Hawk. If the opponent is a
fairly tough type (who says Hawk according to his equilibrium strategy) then both
will choose N in the action stage. This event occurs with probability F(cH)−F(cL).








(−ci)( 1 1 )
Suppose instead player i says Dove. If the opponent is a fairly tough type (who says
Hawk according to his equilibrium strategy) then both will choose B at the action
stage. Otherwise, the opponent will say Dove, player i will choose N at the action
stage, and the opponent will choose B if he is very tough and N if he is normal.








But, equation (6) implies that (11) equals (12) if ci = cH so player i of type cH is
indiﬀerent between saying Dove and Hawk. By (8), if ci >c H then (11) is smaller
than (12) so player i prefers to say Dove. If c∗ ≤ ci <c H, (11) is bigger than (12) so
player i prefers to say Hawk.
These results show that the strategy pro￿le speci￿ed is a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium of the cheap talk extension of the arms race game. Since cL → 0a n dcH → 0
as ￿ → 0, it is evident from the construction of the strategies that the fraction of
types that play B in equilibrium goes to zero as ￿ goes to zero.
4 Related Literature
The idea that fear and mutual distrust, sparked by uncertainty about the opponent￿s
motives, may be the cause of con￿ict has a rich history. Thucydides [19] (Book I, 23)
argued that ￿the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta￿
made the Peloponnesian War inevitable.6 Rousseau (quoted in Jervis [7]) argued that
￿It is quite true that it would be much better for all men to remain always at peace.
But so long as there is no security for this, everyone, having no guarantee that he
can avoid war, is anxious to begin it at the moment which suits his own interest
and so forestall a neighbor, who would not fail to forestall the attack in turn at any
moment favorable to himself, so that many wars, even oﬀensive wars, are rather in
6A famous passage describes how the Spartans are spurred on by the Corinthians: ￿You Spartans
are the only people in Hellas who wait calmly on events, relying on your defense not on action
but on making people think you will act. You alone do nothing in the early stages to prevent an
enemy￿s expansion; you wait till the enemy has doubled his strength. Certainly you used to have the
reputation of being safe and sure enough; now one wonders if this reputation was deserved.......The
Athenians...live close to you, yet you still do not appear to notice them; instead of going out to meet
them, you prefer to stand still and wait till you are attacked, thus hazarding everything by ￿ghting
with opponents who have grown far stronger than they were originally￿ (Book I, 69, [19]).
12the nature of unjust precautions for the protection of the assailant￿s own possessions
than a device for seizing those of others.￿ Pigou (1941, Chapter 2) argued that ￿in
view of the enormous expense of modern military and naval operations, and of the
chance that a war begun on a small scale may draw in other Powers, it is extremely
improbable that there will be to any country in the end any balance of economic
gain...The fear of war itself forces governments to adopt policies that make war more
likely...Nursed by the fear of war, they themselves make war more likely and are the
cause of further fears.￿ It is often argued that the arms race spiral that preceded
World War I was caused by Britain￿s and Germany￿s mutual distrust of each other,
rather than any nation￿s desire to ￿g h taw a r( W a i n s t e i n[ 2 0 ]a n dS o n t a g[ 1 8 ] ) .M a n y
authors have argued that similar mechanisms operated during the cold war (see the
quote by Ronald Reagan in the Introduction).
Jervis [7] describes the security dilemma as a situation where each state thinks
the best possible outcome is for nobody to invest in new weapons, but the fear that
the opponent may arm causes all states to buy weapons. When this initial arms
build-up becomes public information, it triggers subsequent rounds of arms build-up,
which Jervis calls the spiralling model. Jervis did not provide any formal model and
in fact argued that irrationality is a crucial component of arms races and con￿ict:
￿if the spiral theory is correct, it is so partly because the actors do not understand
it or follow its prescriptions￿ (Jervis [7], page 81). Schelling [17] provides a formal
model where fully rational players may attack each other inadvertently because of a
￿false alarm.￿ Knowing that the other may inadvertently attack, each will be more
likely to mount an inadvertent attack, hence there is a multiplier eﬀect, just as in
our model. However, if the underlying problem is an imperfect warning system then
there is no private information that can be transmitted via cheap talk. Our results
show that cheap talk can be highly useful when the underlying problem is incomplete
information about preferences. Like Schelling, we assume all decision makers are
perfectly rational.
Game theoretic articles related to the Schelling multiplier eﬀect include Rubinstein
[16], Carlsson and van Damme [3] and Morris and Shin [10] (see Morris and Shin [11]
for a survey). However, these authors assume that players￿ types are correlated in
a way which would be unnatural in our context. They do not consider the role of
cheap talk. We obtain a multiplier eﬀect without any correlation of types, and our
focus is on the cheap talk extension. Unlike most articles in the cheap-talk literature,
we assume both players have private information, send messages, and take actions.
The exceptions include a recent article by Baliga and Morris [1] which contains an
example of cheap talk with two-sided incomplete information, an article on double
auctions by Matthews and Postlewaite [9], and an article on the battle-of-the-sexes
game with two sided incomplete information by Banks and Calvert [2].
In the battle-of-the-sexes game discussed by Banks and Calvert [2], each player
has his own favorite outcome, but the intensity of his preference is determined by
his type (￿high￿ or ￿low￿). There is no dominant strategy type and no multiplier
13eﬀect. Without communication there are eﬃcient asymmetric Bayesian Nash equilib-
ria where one player always gets his favorite outcome. However, the only symmetric
equilibrium involves a randomization which is ineﬃcient. Banks and Calvert show
how communication can improve by achieving a symmetric equilibrium where coor-
dination occurs more frequently, and player i￿s favorite action is more likely to be
chosen when the intensity of his preference is high. In the battle-of-the sexes game,
player i always wants player j to take the same action as player i, while in our game
player i always wants player j to disarm regardless of what player i does, so the
nature of communication is somewhat diﬀerent. The paper by Banks and Calvert
[2] is particularly interesting because they show that a mediator may be necessary
for eﬃciency. We can approximate ￿rst-best eﬃciency without a mediator when the
dominant strategy types are rare. The case where the dominant strategy types are
not rare is left for future work.
5 Conclusion
This paper makes two contributions. First, we provide a formalization of Schelling￿s
[17] multiplier eﬀect using incomplete information about preferences rather than an
imperfect warning system. Our model is very close to Schelling￿s informal argument:
￿If I go downstairs to investigate a noise at night, with a gun in my hand, and ￿nd
myself face to face with a burglar who has a gun in his hand, there is a danger of
an outcome that neither of us desires. Even if he prefers to leave quietly, and I wish
him to, there is a danger that he may think I want to shoot, and shoot ￿rst. Worse,
there is danger that he may think that I think he wants to shoot. Or he may think
that I think he thinks I want to shoot. And so on.￿ (Schelling [17], page 207). Our
second contribution is to show how cheap talk can resolve Schelling￿s dilemma. The
equilibrium has several interesting properties. First, there is a positive probability
t h a tap l a y e rs e n d sah a w k i s hm e s s a g e . I fb o t hp l a y e r sd ot h i s ,t h e r ei sn oa r m s
race, but the combination of a hawkish and a dovish message triggers an arms race.
Second, there is a positive probability that a player sends a dovish message but then
embarks on a unilateral arms build up. In such a case, the opponent will be at a
disadvantage, but from an ex ante perspective the gamble was worth taking. In fact,
the introduction of cheap talk raises all types￿ expected payoﬀs, since without cheap
talk the unique equilibrium involves an arms race with probability one.
In the real world, non-binding agreements seem to be important. For example,
the signing of a test ban treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963
appears to have been a brake on the arms race, even though the treaty was essentially
non-enforceable in the absence of a ￿world government￿. But occasionally, a ruthless
leader will break the promises he has made. In 1935 the British and the Germans
exchanged dovish messages, resulting in a naval accord which limited the German
￿eet to 35 % of the British. Hitler, of course, did not intend to respect any treaty,
14but the British did not know that.7 The British realized that the accord was ￿cheap
talk￿ and they worried about the fact that Hitler￿s true military strength was diﬃcult
to assess, but they felt that trusting Hitler was a chance worth taking (Kissinger [8],
pp. 295-296). In 1940, Goebbels described Hitler￿s success at taking advantage of the
credulity of the western powers: ￿up to now we have succeeded in leaving the enemy in
the dark concerning Germany￿s real goals... They left us alone and let us slip through
the risky zone, and we were able to sail around all dangerous reefs. And when we were
done, and well armed, better than they, then they started the war!￿( K i s s i n g e r[ 8 ] ,p .
295). In contrast, the messages sent by the British and the Germans in 1912 may be
identi￿ed as dovish and hawkish, respectively. The major new weapons technology
was the Dreadnought warship. With an arms race looming on the horizon the British
felt ￿it might be possible by friendly, sincere and intimate conversation to avert this
perilous development￿ and that ￿surely something could be done to break the chain
of blind causation￿ (Churchill [4], p. 75). Churchill proposed a ￿naval holiday￿ for
1913, where each nation would promise not to build any new Dreadnoughts, but the
messages coming from the Kaiser were not at all conciliatory. An arms race followed
(Churchill [4], pp. 79-81). Perhaps some of the logic of a cheap-talk equilibrium can
be seen in these examples.
6A p p e n d i x
Before giving the proof of Lemma 1 we need a technical result.
Lemma 6 If the multiplier condition holds, then there exists γ > 0 such that F 0(c)d>
1 for all c ∈ (0,γ).
Proof. Since F has a power series representation by assumption, the function






The multiplier condition says that λ(c) ≥ 0f o ra l lc ≥ 0. Moreover, k0 =0s i n c e
λ(0) = 0. Also, as λ(ﬂ c)=d − ﬂ c>0 by assumption, there is j such that kj 6=0 .L e t
n ≥ 1b et h esmallest integer such that kn 6=0 . For small enough c>0 the expression
in (13) will be dominated by the term kncn. Hence, we must have kn > 0f o rλ(c) ≥ 0







7Hitler￿s abrogation of the naval accord is described by Craig [5] pages 686 and 710. Other dovish
messages sent by Hitler included the signing of the German-Polish non-aggression pact.
15which for small enough c>0 is dominated by the term nkncn−1 > 0. Hence, λ
0(c)=
F 0(c)d − 1 > 0f o rc>0 close enough to zero.
Proof of Lemma 1.
De￿ne two functions H and G as follows:
H(x,y) ≡ [F(y) − F(x)]x − (1 − F(y))￿ (14)
G(x,y) ≡ [1 − 2(F(y) − F(x))]y − F(x)d (15)
Then, equations (5) and (6) are equivalent to the statement that (x,y)=( cL,c H)
solves the equation system
H(x,y)=0
G(x,y)=0 (16)
To analyze this system consider the shape of the two curves de￿ned by (16),
restricting our attention to x and y in [0,ﬂ c]. We have
H(0,y)=−(1 − F(y))￿
Therefore, there is a unique y ∈ [0,ﬂ c], namely, y =ﬂ c, such that H(0,y)=0 . Similarly,
H(ﬂ c,y)=−(1 − F(y))(￿ +ﬂ c)
so that there is a unique y ∈ [0,ﬂ c], namely, y =ﬂ c, such that H(ﬂ c,y)=0 . For 0 <x<ﬂ c
we notice that
H(x,0) = −F(x)x − ￿<0





0(y)(x + ￿) > 0
Therefore, there is a unique y ∈ (0,ﬂ c)t h a ts a t i s ￿es H(x,y)=0 . We may write
y = φ(x), where H(x,φ(x)) ≡ 0 for all x ∈ [0,ﬂ c]. Notice that for all x>0,￿→ 0
implies φ(x) → x.
Next, we turn to the G function. We have
G(x,0) ≡− F(x)d
so that there is a unique x ∈ [0,ﬂ c], namely, x =0 , such that G(x,0) = 0. Let cmed
















Notice that 2cmed = cmed/F(cmed) ≤ d by the multiplier assumption. If cmed/F(cmed)=
d then G(x,cmed) = 0 for all x ∈ [0,ﬂ c]. However, if cmed/F(cmed) <d ,then there is a
unique x ∈ [0,ﬂ c], namely x =0 , such that G(x,cmed)=0 .
16Now suppose 0 <y<c med. Then
G(0,y) ≡ [1 − 2F(y)]y>0
and
G(y,y) ≡ y − F(y)d ≤ 0


















≤ 0( 1 7 )
using the multiplier condition. Hence, for each y ∈ (0,c med), there is a unique x ∈
(0,y] such that G(x,y)=0 . We may write x = θ(y), where G(θ(y),y) ≡ 0f o ra l l
y ∈ (0,c med).































1 − 2(F(y) − F(x)) − 2F 0(y)y
F 0(x)(d − 2y)
(18)
For small enough x and y, (18) is strictly positive since both numerator and denom-
inator are strictly positive. To show that (18) is strictly smaller than 1, it suﬃces to
show that
1 − 2(F(y) − F(x)) − 2F 0(y)y





since, for small enough x, F 0(x)d>1 by Lemma 6. But (19) is equivalent to
(F
0(y)d − 1)y +( F(y) − F(x))d>0( 2 0 )
The ￿rst term in (20) is strictly positive for small enough y, by Lemma 6, while the
second term is non-negative since y ≥ x. Thus, (20) is satis￿ed.
17Figure 1 is a typical depiction of (16). Notice that the G function does not involve
￿, hence the function θ does not involve ￿ either. However, for all x>0,￿→ 0
implies φ(x) → x. Since 0 <d θ(y)/dy < 1, for small enough ￿>0t h et w oc u r v e s
y = φ(x)a n dx = θ(y) must have an intersection arbitrarily close to the point (0,0)
in the positive quadrant, and with y>x>0a sd e p i c t e di nt h eF i g u r e .T h i sp o i n ti s
denoted (x,y)=( cL,c H). Notice that cH >c L.
It remains only to show that ￿<c L <c ∗ <c H. Notice that for (cL,c H)c l o s et o
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Since cL > 0a n d￿>0, (21) and (22) imply ￿<c L.

















Clearly c∗ exists, because 1 − F(cH)+F(cL) > 0. We claim that cL <c ∗ <c H.T h e







































































But these two inequalities and equation (23) imply cL <c ∗ <c H.
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